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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A year can be a long time in politics. One year ago, at the First Annual 
Climate and Energy Law Symposium here at the University of San 
Diego, there was good reason to believe that, at long last, the nation was 
about to enact significant climate change legislation. The United States 
Supreme Court had two years earlier set the table for a new Administration 
 *  Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Professor of Law, Georgetown University, and 
Stanley Legro Visiting Professor of Law, University of San Diego (2009–2010). This 
essay is based on a presentation at the Second Annual Climate and Energy Law 
Symposium—Next Generation Regulation: Instrument Choice in Climate Law—held at 
the University of San Diego School of Law on April 9, 2010. Much of the content of this 
essay borrows from a lengthier treatment of the topic first published in the Cornell Law 
Review, in 2009. See Richard J. Lazarus Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: 
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009). 
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and a new Congress, by requiring in Massachusetts v. EPA, that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) reconsider its prior decision 
of choosing not to determine whether greenhouse gas emissions from 
new motor vehicles endanger public health or welfare.1  The new President, 
Barack Obama, appointed individuals strongly supportive of sweeping 
and comprehensive climate change legislation to important leadership 
positions throughout the executive branch, including White House Climate 
Change and Energy Advisor Carol Browner, EPA Administrator Lisa 
Jackson, Council on Environmental Quality Chair Nancy Sutley, Secretary 
of Energy Lawrence Chu, and Presidential Science Advisor John Holdren.  
Congress seemed no less favorably inclined.  The relevant leadership 
positions in both chambers, from the Senate Majority Leader and Speaker 
of the House to the Chairs of the most important authorization committees, 
seemed disproportionately dominated by allies of climate change 
legislation, with a heavy dose of California: Majority Leader Harry Reid, 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Committee on the Environment and Public 
Works Chair Barbara Boxer, and House Commerce Committee Chair 
Henry Waxman. 
Yet only a year later, political pundits of every stripe are writing 
climate change legislation’s obituary.2  Both sides of the debate are 
treating as politically dead the legislation that the House passed in June 
20093 and the bill that the Senate Democratic leadership introduced with 
great fanfare in the fall of 2009.4  The only climate change legislation 
that currently enjoys significant bi-partisan support, moreover, seeks to 
prevent rather than impose greenhouse gas emission controls, by preventing 
EPA from implementing new rules intended to provide for such controls 
based on the existing Clean Air Act.5 
 1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 2. John M. Broder, Climate Change Bill Is in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, 
available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/climate-change-bill-is-in-
doubt/; Katie Connolly, Why Climate Change Is Dead in the Senate, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 
25, 2010, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/234137; Editorial, Backing Down 
on Climate Change, Feb. 5, 2010, L.A. TIMES, available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2010/feb/05/opinion/la-ed-climate5-2010feb05; Juliet Eilperin, Cap-and-Trade Declared 
Dead—Again, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2010, available at http://views.washingtonpost.com/ 
climate-change/post-carbon/2010/03/cap-and-trade_declared_dead—again.html; Juliet 
Eilperin & Steven Mufson, Senators to Propose Abandoning Cap-and-trade, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 27, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/ 
26/AR2010022606084.html. 
 3.  H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (passed by 1st Sess. of the House on June 26, 
2009). 
 4.  Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(introduced Sept. 30, 2009); Senate Rep. No. 111-121, Clean Energy Jobs and American 
Power Act, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010). 
 5. S.J. Res. 26, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess. (introduced Jan. 21, 2010) (disapproving a 
rule submitted by EPA relating to the endangerment finding and the cause or contribute 
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How did this happen? A few too many snowflakes in the nation’s 
capital in February 2010?6  A handful of misguided emails from scientists 
who should have kept to their science and left politics to politicians?7 A 
tea party in Massachusetts that placed a truck-driving Republican in Ted 
Kennedy’s Senate seat in Massachusetts?8 Or a Senate procedural rule 
from an earlier political era that, when applied in modern times, 
effectively bars the passage of any new significant legislation?9 
findings for greenhouse gases under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act) (sponsors 
include Senators Murkowski, Chambliss, Landrieu, Thune, Hutchison, Graham, Coburn, 
Vitter, Cornyn, Isakson, Grassley, Alexander, Bond, Inhofe, Bunning, Carper, Brownback, 
Roberts, McConnell, Enzi, McCain, Wicker, Lugar, Corker, Cochran, Kyl, Bennett, 
Risch, Johanns, Sessions, Voinovich, Burr, Shelby, Gregg, Hatch, and LeMieux). 
 6. Christine Todd Whitman et al., Did D.C.’s Blizzard Bury Climate Change 
Legislation? (“The recent bout of wintry weather and the overall political climate have 
almost certainly killed climate-change legislation this year.”), WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 
2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/12/ 
R2010021203910.html; Alexander Bolton, Climate-Change Legislation Buried Under 
Record Snowfall in Capital, THE HILL, Feb. 9, 2010, available at http://thehill.com/home 
news/senate/80485-climate-bill-buried-under-record-snowfall (“Sen. Jim DeMint . . . 
used the D.C. snowstorm to make a political jab . . . . It’s going to keep snowing in DC 
until Al Gore cries ̀̀’uncle.’”). John M. Broder, Climate-Change Debate Is Heating up in 
Deep Freeze, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
02/11/science/earth/11climate.html. 
 7. Andrew C. Revkin, Hacked E-Mail Is New Fodder for Climate Dispute, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/science/earth/ 
21climate.html; Juliet Eilperin & David A. Fahrenthold, Series of Missteps by Climate 
Scientists Threatens Climate-Change Agenda, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/14/AR2010021404283.html. 
 8. Darren Samuelsohn, Sen.-Elect Brown’s Win Adds More Question Marks to 
Senate Climate Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/cwire/2010/01/20/20climatewire-sen-elect-browns-win-adds-more-question-mark-
48190.html; Evan Lehmann, Sen.-Elect Brown Is a ‘Blank Slate’ on Climate, Drawing 
Concern and Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/cwire/2010/01/21/21climatewire-sen-elect-brown-is-a-blank-slate-on-climate-41366. 
html; William O’Keefe, Planet Panel: Legislation Will Likely Be Delayed, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 15, 2010, available at http://views.washingtonpost.com/climate-change/panelists/ 
william_okeefe/2010/01/legislation_will_likely_be_delayed.html (“[Due to Scott Brown’s 
election], climate legislation has been put off for at least the rest of this year.”). 
 9. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 
181 (1997) (“The filibuster in the United States Senate imposes an effective supermajority 
requirement for the enactment of most legislation.”); Norman Ornstein, Our Broken 
Senate, THE AMERICAN, March/April 2008, available at http://www.american.com/archive/ 
2008/march-april-magazine-contents/our-broken-senate (“Filibusters . . . simply [don’t] 
provide any hope of regular 51-vote majorities.”); Thomas Geoghegan, Op-ed, Mr. Smith 
Rewrites the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/01/11/opinion/11geoghegan.html (“[T]he Senate, as it now operates, really 
has become unconstitutional: . . . a 60-vote majority is required to overcome a filibuster 
and pass any contested bill.”). 
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The blueprint for construction of the political wall now seemingly 
blocking climate change legislation in Washington no doubt includes a 
mix of each of the above features, with the Senate procedural rules 
serving as the most portentous deal-breaker. But there is a more sobering 
political lesson to be drawn from the remarkable reversal of political 
fortunes.  Climate change’s gloomy political fate right now is not the 
product of mere meteorological bad luck or political missteps.  What is 
telling is that it could take seemingly so little to change so much so quickly.  
And, that unfortunately, is the truly bad news for those concerned about 
climate change. 
The reason that it took so little to shift political fortunes so 
significantly is that many people, businesses, and political leaders would 
prefer to be climate skeptics, no matter how overwhelming the scientific 
evidence to the contrary.  That is why they will readily embrace almost 
any available excuse—even some extra snowflakes—to ignore the 
problem.  Justice Antonin Scalia, during the oral argument in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, expressed what is probably the unstated feeling of many 
Americans when, acknowledging that he was “not a scientist,” he added 
that “[t]hat’s why I don’t want to have to deal with global warming, to 
tell you the truth.”10 
Justice Scalia is, of course, right.  No one wants to have to “deal with 
global warming,” for understandable reasons.  The politics of climate 
change are several orders of magnitude more difficult than the science of 
climate change.  It is no less than a lawmaking nightmare.11  National 
healthcare legislation is mere child’s play compared to climate change.  
The challenge for climate change is no less than to persuade the world’s 
most powerful nations and industries to dramatically curtail the 
greenhouse gas emissions upon which their current economies and high 
standards of living are premised.  And they must do so although the 
costs of such curtailment will be immediate and potentially huge, 
compared to benefits realized not only in distant times and places but 
also only if not eliminated altogether by increased emissions from 
developing nations beyond the reach of any international lawmaking 
authority.  Presented with such a nightmarish political scenario that 
seemingly offers little hope for a lawmaking answer, it should not be 
surprising that many people are quick to conclude that climate change is 
in fact no more than a bad dream, which they can readily avoid by 
 10. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007) (No. 05-1120). 
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waking up.  Choosing between hope and hopelessness, they naturally 
choose hope. 
Climate scientists and environmentalists would be delighted to be 
wrong about climate change.  But there is little beyond wishful thinking 
to believe that their concerns are misdirected.  The basic scientific 
foundation of the existing scientific consensus regarding the significant 
threats posed by climate change and humankind’s contributions to it 
remains largely intact.  The need for climate legislation is no less pressing 
today than it was a year ago.  Indeed, given the inherent costs of delay—
because the more emissions rise the more costly it is to reduce them in 
the future12—the case for climate legislation is even more compelling 
than it was one year ago. 
Fortunately, with a nod to Mark Twain, my own view is that “reports 
of [climate change’s] death are greatly exaggerated.”  This is not the first 
time environmental law’s obituary has been written.13  In the early 1970s, 
many considered environmental law a flash-in-the-pan fad, especially 
after the oil embargo during the middle of that decade. And, few thought 
environmental regulations could survive intact after they were targeted 
for major reformation by an enormously popular President, Ronald Reagan, 
during the 1980s.  Yet, on each of those prior occasions, environmental 
law has not only revived to meet the next set of daunting challenges but 
in fact rebounded with increased vigor.14  That is why I fully expect that, 
buoyed by a new wave of scientific reports and the backing of the White 
House, climate change’s lawmaking moment will, Lazarus-like, soon be 
resurrected. 
As I have written elsewhere at greater length,15 the inherent problem 
with such lawmaking moments is just that—they are moments.  What 
Congress and the President do with much fanfare can quickly and quietly 
slip away in the ensuing years.  This is famously so in environmental law.  
Subsequent legislative amendments, limited budgets, appropriations 
riders, interpretive agency rulings, massive delays in rule-making, and 
simple nonenforcement are more than capable of converting a seemingly 
uncompromising legal mandate into nothing more than a symbolic 
 12. Id. at 1164–68. 
 13. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xi–xii (Univ. 
of Chicago Press, 2004). 
 14. Id. at xi–xiii. 
 15. The subsequent discussion in this essay excerpts from that prior article. For a 
more in-depth treatment of the themes discussed herein, see Lazarus, supra note *. 
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aspirational statement.  In short, what Congress and the President give, 
they can just as easily take away.  The same powerful short-term impulses 
that seek to prevent a law’s enactment in the first instance do not disappear 
upon the law’s passage.  They instead typically remain to seek the law’s 
ultimate undoing over time. 
The critical lesson for climate change legislation is that the pending 
lawmaking moment must include the enactment of provisions specifically 
designed to maintain the legislation’s ability to achieve its long-term 
objectives over the longer term.  For climate change legislation to be 
successful, the new legal framework must simultaneously be flexible in 
certain respects and steadfast in others.  Flexibility is necessary to allow 
for the modification of legal requirements over time in light of new 
information.  Steadfastness or “stickiness” is important to maintain the 
stability of a law’s requirements over time.  The need for both is particularly 
great for climate change legislation.  Flexibility is absolutely essential 
for climate change legislation in light of the enormity of the undertaking, 
both in its temporal and spatial reach, and the surrounding uncertainty 
concerning the wisdom of specific regulatory approaches.  Yet the basic 
legal framework and legal mandate must also be steadfast enough to be 
maintained over the long term notwithstanding what will be an unrelenting 
barrage of extremely powerful short-term economic interests that will 
inevitably seek the mandate’s relaxation. 
To that end, the law will need to include institutional design features 
that allow for such flexibility but insulate programmatic implementation 
to a significant extent from powerful political and economic interests 
propelled by short-term concerns.  Such design features will include 
“precommitment strategies,”16 which deliberately make it hard (but 
never impossible) to change the law in response to some kinds of concerns.  
At the same time, the legislation should also include contrasting 
precommitment strategies that deliberately make it easier to change the 
law in response to other longer-term concerns that are in harmony with 
the law’s central purpose, which is to achieve and maintain greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions over time.  Such concerns are otherwise less 
likely to have powerful voices in lawmaking fora.  Directed to all three 
branches of government, such institutional design features should 
therefore be deliberately asymmetric, making it easier to change the law 
in one substantive direction rather than another. 
 16. Id. at 1158; see also id. at 1205–31 (discussing the ways precommitment 
strategies might be used to affect the actions of the legislative and executive branches); 
see generally Samuel Freeman, Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views, 19 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 122, 143 (1990) (defining “joint commitment”); Thomas C. Schelling, 
Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357, 363–64 (1985) (giving examples 
of rules set in the present for the purpose of affecting future behaviors). 
34 
 
LAZARUS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2016  12:11 PM 
[VOL. 2:  29, 2010]  Climate Change Law in and Over Time 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
The obvious objection to any such deliberate modifications of lawmaking 
processes, especially those that make future lawmaking more difficult, is 
that they are antidemocratic.  These modifications allow the views of 
existing majorities to trump the views of future majorities who may well 
view sound public policy very differently.  The shorthand reference to 
this objection, of course, is that the dead hand of the past or present 
should not be able to govern the future.17 
There are, however, at least three compelling reasons why the dead 
hand concern is not persuasive as applied to the need for substantial 
lawmaking restraints in federal climate change legislation.  The first is 
that such restraints, notwithstanding their seemingly antidemocratic 
implications, have a long and widely accepted history in domestic law, 
ranging from the Constitution’s organization of the House and the Senate 
to a host of existing federal statutes that seek to insulate somewhat uncertain 
decisions from politics.  Hence, such restraints, rather than suggest a 
departure from the nation’s lawmaking traditions, at the very least fall 
well within them.  Second, the lawmaking restraints in federal climate 
change legislation would be deliberately asymmetric in order to further 
the options available to future generations, not restrict them.  Skewing 
currently exists in lawmaking in general and certain interest groups exercise 
undue influence at the expense of others.  The institutional lawmaking 
design features contemplated for federal climate legislation would be 
designed to redress that existing skewing and therefore ultimately foster 
and not undermine the fundamental values underlying representative 
government.18 
The final justification relates to the sheer impracticalities of failing to 
address over the longer term the threats now posed by climate change.  
Preserving the ability of future majorities to retain the full range of 
options necessary for self-government most likely depends on climate 
change legislation being capable of maintaining greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions over the longer term.  Otherwise, current lawmakers will 
undercut the autonomy of future majorities by subjecting them to a 
natural environment that sharply curtails their options.  In other words, 
cross-temporal majority effects will occur with or without climate change 
legislation.  The question is not whether to have such cross-temporal 
 17. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at 
1194. 
 18. Id. at 1194–95. 
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impacts, but which ones to have.  To the extent, therefore, that lawmaking 
restraints are a necessary component of climate change legislation that 
can provide future majorities with greater opportunities, they further 
rather than undermine democratic norms.19 
The section below describes some preliminary ideas, many of which 
are traceable to strategies that Congress has previously embraced in 
other contexts.  Some are directed to congressional lawmaking.  Others 
are aimed at Executive Branch implementation.20 
A. Congress 
One option is to design federal climate legislation in a manner that 
would create a powerful political constituency with a strong economic 
incentive favoring the legislation’s preservation.  Such provisions should 
not be difficult to create.  For instance, a tradable emissions program 
would be expected to generate billions of dollars in revenue from the 
sale of emissions rights.21  Those revenues could be allocated to address 
climate change concerns, ranging from efforts to develop more efficient 
technologies capable of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to assistance 
to persons and places likely to suffer from both the climate change no 
longer avoidable and dislocations caused by a shift to an economy that 
produces lower emissions. Recipients of those funds would have a strong 
incentive to resist legislative amendments that threaten the continued 
availability of such financial support. 
A different tack is to limit more directly the lawmaking avenue most 
susceptible to use by powerful, narrowly focused interests seeking to 
gain short-term economic advantage: the appropriations process.  To the 
great detriment of environmental law, it is the appropriations process 
that has most lent itself to such efforts by riddling environmental law 
with appropriations riders and earmarks.22  One possible anticipatory 
response is to include procedural hurdles or canons of statutory 
construction targeted directly to laws enacted exclusively through the 
appropriations process. The justification would be the shared understanding 
that the appropriations process does not lend itself to the careful 
deliberations generally warranted for major changes in substantive law. 
 19. Id. at 1195. 
 20. For a full description of these options, see id. at 1205–31. 
 21. See Peter Crampton & Suzi Kerr, Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How 
and Why to Auction Not Grandfather, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 333, 334 (2002) (suggesting 
that a tradeable emissions permit auction could generate $125 billion per year). 
 22. See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative 
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 638–52 (2006). 
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A far bolder move, however, is to insulate parts of the greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction and climate change adaptation programs from the 
appropriations process altogether.  What Congress did with the Federal 
Reserve Board provides the legislative precedent.  Congress allowed the 
Federal Reserve Board to retain revenue it generated in its operations in 
order to shield the Board from the politics of the congressional 
appropriations process.23  The same could be done in the context of climate 
change.  Implementation of federal climate change legislation will, 
assuming a tradable emissions program, generate billions of dollars in 
revenue.24  Some of that revenue could be used to insulate the especially 
vulnerable aspects of the greenhouse gas regulation program from the 
appropriations process and therefore the short-term economic interests 
that tend to dominate that particular lawmaking avenue. 
B. Executive Branch Lawmaking 
There are many ways to design climate change legislation in anticipation 
of problems that may arise in the Executive Branch’s administration of 
the law.  Some measures could be designed to insulate agency officials 
to some extent from political pressures, especially those pressures likely 
to derive from short-term economic concerns, which undermine the 
law’s effectiveness.  Other measures could be crafted to enhance the 
influence of interest groups that are concerned about protecting future 
generations but which otherwise lack the necessary economic or political 
clout.  Some of the possibilities worthy of consideration are catalogued 
and described below. 
1. Insulating (Somewhat) Agency Officials from Politics 
A variety of measures could be used to try to insulate agency officials 
from the short-term political pressures that could undermine a climate 
change statute’s effective, fair, and impartial administration.  None 
purports to achieve complete insulation, nor should they.  Political 
influence is neither all bad nor all inappropriate.  Quite often, some 
political accountability is necessary for a law’s legitimacy.  The purpose 
 23. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at 
1203–04. 
 24. See supra note 21. 
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of such insulating measures is to temper, not eliminate, the influence of 
politics on statutory implementation. 
For instance, federal climate change legislation could define in some 
detail the substantive qualifications, tenures, and grounds for removal or 
disqualification of specific agency officials charged with particularly 
important and sensitive statutory responsibilities.  There is no reason for 
Congress to delegate complete discretion on such potentially important 
matters to the President, cabinet secretary, agency head, or other agency 
officials.25 
2. Structuring the Implementation Process to Diminish the Influence   
of Short-Term Interests Likely to be Unduly Influential and to                
Promote Consideration of Longer-Term Interests Otherwise                 
Unlikely to Receive Their Due Weight 
A second category of institutional design features pertains to techniques 
for ensuring that certain kinds of factors are given due consideration and 
that others are not given undue weight during the Executive Branch’s 
implementation of climate change legislation.  These techniques can be 
used to promote accountability, deliberativeness, impartiality, and 
transparency in general.  Alternatively, they can be shaped to ensure that 
specific factors that are anticipated to be undervalued instead receive 
their due.  Several possibilities are described below. 
• Requirements for interagency consultation to promote a fuller 
consideration of relevant factors and therefore reduce the prospects 
of a narrow, short-term interest hijacking a law’s implementation.26 
• Creation of a new expert governmental entity to ensure that 
certain interests are given due weight during agency implementation 
of climate change legislation. 
 25. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at 
1212–16. 
 26. Interagency consultation requirements are a regular feature of environmental 
statutes. For instance, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires that federal agencies 
subject to section 7 of the Act consult with the Secretary of the Interior (for terrestrial 
wildlife or plants) or the Secretary of Commerce (for marine life) if they believe that an 
endangered or threatened species may be adversely affected by a contemplated agency 
action. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2006). Another example of an existing, effective 
interagency consultation requirement is section 309 of the Clean Air Act, which requires 
federal agencies preparing environmental impact statements pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act to provide the EPA with an opportunity to review their draft 
impact statements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (2006) (“The Administrator shall review and 
comment in writing on the environmental impact of any matter relating to duties and 
responsibilities granted pursuant to this chapter or other provisions of the authority of the 
Administrator . . . .”). 
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• Provisions for consideration of more neutral, objective scientific 
expertise during statutory implementation to diminish the influence 
of politically powerful short-term economic interests and promote 
consideration of longer-term consequences if supported by 
scientific evidence. 
• Participatory rights for selected stakeholders in the implementation 
stages to ensure that important but less politically powerful 
voices are heard during statutory implementation.27 
3. Maintaining and, if Necessary, Accelerating the Executive Branch’s 
Implementation of Climate Change Legislation 
A third category of design features will anticipate the many roadblocks 
that will occur during the process of statutory implementation within the 
Executive Branch, especially over the long term.  Such features would 
deliberately build into the original statutory scheme mechanisms that 
directly limit the effectiveness of the roadblock.  These features could 
accomplish that end in different ways: sometimes by creating lawmaking 
shortcuts that circumvent the roadblock and other times simply by 
eliminating the roadblock altogether.  The statutory objective in either 
circumstance would be the same: to prevent the Executive Branch, either 
intentionally or negligently, from frustrating congressional objectives by 
delaying the law’s implementation. 
a. For instance, Congress can create a lawmaking shortcut that allows 
lawmaking to be made in the absence of Executive Branch action within 
a specified time period.  This can occur if Congress would actually 
prefer Executive Branch lawmaking but anticipates that roadblocks may 
prevent the agency from acting in a sufficiently expeditious manner.  
Both to encourage the agency to act, and to ensure that law is made 
without undue delay, Congress can create a lawmaking scheme that is 
triggered by default in the event that the agency fails to act by the 
statutorily specified deadline.28  Drafters of climate change legislation 
 27. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at 
1216–25. 
 28. Congress embraced such a design feature in the Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, by adding what have been 
euphemistically referred to as “soft” and “hard” “hammers” that call for automatic imposition 
of extraordinarily harsh pretreatment standards in the event that the EPA misses the 
statutorily prescribed deadlines for promulgation of pretreatment standards. See 42 
U.S.C. § 6904. Congress’s establishment of a default standard completely changed the 
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might well want to consider including such lawmaking shortcuts that 
precommit to certain climate change emissions reduction requirements 
in the absence of the necessary subsequent action taken by the Executive 
Branch agency charged with the law’s implementation.  The potential is 
considerable that those resisting imposition of climate change emissions 
reduction requirements will seek to delay their implementation.  But by 
anticipating that potential and precommiting to certain legal standards in 
the event of delays greater than a specified time period, climate change 
legislation can effectively both reduce the incentive for such obstructionist 
efforts and ensure that a lengthy legal vacuum does not result.29 
b. Congress could also create a lawmaking shortcut by separating the 
policy question of what standard should apply in a particular factual 
circumstance from the distinct factual inquiry of whether that 
circumstance is actually present.  A statutorily prescribed standard triggered 
by a subsequent agency finding allows Congress to dictate what the 
regulatory requirements or other regulatory measures must be to address 
different degrees of environmental hazards but then leave to another 
entity the responsibility (and potential political heat) of making the 
finding that triggers the standard.  Congress, in effect, precommits to a 
series of lawmaking standards that someone else then triggers.30  Congress 
therefore is not itself immediately responsible for making the hard 
political choice. 
Climate change legislation could also utilize this kind of precommitment 
device.  Congress could precommit to increasingly stringent standards 
depending, for instance, on the degree of greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions deemed necessary.  This precommitment would allow Congress 
to make the critical policy determination regarding which kinds and 
combinations of regulatory measures and economic incentives would be 
best to achieve different levels of emissions reduction.  But at the same 
lawmaking dynamic. Not only did the EPA have an overriding incentive to meet the 
deadlines, but regulated industry also had an incentive to ensure the agency’s compliance. 
See James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 
1980’s, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 351 (1986) (noting that Congress “established self-
enforcing standards to be implemented in the absence of agency action”); Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to Link Environmental 
Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 839 (1997). 
 29. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at 
1225–26. 
 30. The nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
illustrate this possibility.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–15. Here again, Congress sought to take 
away the EPA’s discretion to decide what regulatory measures were necessary to address 
varying degrees of nonattainment of national ambient air quality standards. Accordingly, 
Congress set forth in exhaustive detail programs that became increasingly prescriptive 
for sources of air pollution as an area of the country went from just barely out of 
compliance to extremely out of compliance.  See id. §§ 7511–12. 
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time, Congress could leave to a more detached, politically insulated body 
the decision regarding how serious the climate change problem truly 
was, how much temperature could rise, and therefore how much reduction 
of emissions was in fact necessary.31 
c.  A statutory provision for non-, limited-, or conditional federal 
preemption of state climate change law could be another effective 
technique for ensuring that federal climate change legislation stays on 
track over the long term.  The extent to which federal law preempts state 
climate change law is likely to be one of the most significant policy 
disputes in the drafting of the federal legislation during the next four 
years.32  Industry generally supports federal preemption of state climate 
law, while states and many environmental organizations oppose it, 
especially in light of what they perceive as decades of foot-dragging on 
the issue by the national government.33  Congress could draft a federal 
preemption provision that both strikes a balance between these competing 
concerns and serves as a very significant check on the federal government’s 
implementation of climate change legislation. 
For instance, the federal statute could make the ultimate scope of 
federal preemption expressly dependent on the success of federal efforts.  
Congress could use any number of benchmarks to measure success or 
lack of success.  The statutory trigger required for preemption, limited 
preemption, or nonpreemption could be a formal finding or action by a 
designated federal government official, a designated committee of 
individuals within or outside the government with relevant expertise, or 
even the states themselves.  Congress could consider just the fact of action 
by a large number of states to be sufficient evidence that there was 
something remiss in the federal effort.  The lifting of federal preemption, 
or the mere threat of a lifting of federal preemption, might well be 
 31. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at 
1226–28. 
 32. See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 900–10, 921–23 (2008) (discussing preemption in the context of 
climate change law). 
 33. See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 925–29 (2008) (suggesting that “state regulation of greenhouse 
gases . . . would benefit from equal attention to the role of state executive agencies in 
asserting power to regulate even in the face of federal resistance”); Felicity Barringer & 
William Yardley, Bush Splits on Greenhouse Gases with Congress and State Officials, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at A1. 
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enough to provide federal officials and industry with the incentives 
necessary to jumpstart a stalled federal program.34 
d. Finally, lawmaking design features could even seek to remove 
altogether anticipated litigation roadblocks to statutory implementation 
by limiting judicial review of some kinds of agency decisions and 
promoting judicial review of other kinds of agency decisions.35  Congress 
could define these limits by focusing on types of decisions or types of 
plaintiffs in determining which kinds of lawsuits threaten timely 
implementation and which kinds of lawsuits are, by contrast, necessary 
to spur timely implementation.  For instance, under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Congress 
limited judicial review of administrative agency orders and remedies to 
clean up hazardous waste sites in order to prevent lawsuits from slowing 
the cleanup process.36  There may well be aspects of the implementation 
of climate change legislation that are at least as urgent and for which 
Congress may want to ensure implementation is not delayed as a result 
of lawsuits brought by certain kinds of aggrieved plaintiffs. 
Conversely, Congress may decide that judicial review is precisely 
what is necessary to eliminate statutory roadblocks, including agency 
enforcement, that Congress anticipates will arise within the Executive 
Branch.  To that end, Congress can authorize certain kinds of plaintiffs 
with certain kinds of claims to bring citizen suits seeking court orders 
that the agency comply with statutory mandates or judicial relief against 
a source of greenhouse gas emissions in violation of federal requirements.  
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that Congress can by statute 
create injuries, define causal chains, and provide for legal redress in a 
manner that allows for a citizen suit that would otherwise fall short of 
Article III.37 
  
 34. See Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change, supra note *, at 
1228–29. 
 35. See id. at 1229–31. 
 36. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
 37. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“‘Congress has the power to 
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or 
controversy where none existed before.’”) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 128 S. Ct. 1142, 1153 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“This case would present different considerations if Congress had sought to provide 
redress for a concrete injury ‘giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
before.’”) (quoting same). 
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II.  CONCLUSION 
One year in politics can be a long time.  During the spring of 2009, 
many assumed Congress would pass significant climate legislation within 
two years, and perhaps even in time for the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 15th Conference of the Parties, to be 
held later that same year in December at Copenhagen.  By that winter, 
however, the political winds seemed to be blowing in the precise opposite 
direction and a no less certain consensus deemed federal climate legislation 
moribund. 
But a broader lesson of these dramatically shifting political winds 
surrounding climate change is that lawmaking design is a critical feature 
of climate change legislation.  Even assuming that Congress will enact 
meaningful climate change legislation in the next few years, the success 
of those legislative efforts will turn on the federal government’s subsequent 
ability to stay the statutory course over the longer term, measured not by 
years but by multiple decades.  Otherwise, significant reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions will not occur. 
The associated lawmaking design challenge is considerable.  One 
must include within the legislative package lawmaking features capable 
of withstanding the strong pressures generated by powerful short-term 
interests seeking implementation delays and exceptions from the law’s 
requirements.  Yet, because the legislation must be maintained over the 
longer term, there must also be some flexibility to allow for learning, 
especially from those interests that are less likely to have the political 
clout required to have their voices heard by those charged with the law’s 
implementation.  The resulting lawmaking design will, accordingly, have to 
be deliberately asymmetrical in an effort to counter those asymmetries 
that already dominate our political system and that threaten to unravel 
the effectiveness of climate legislation once enacted. 
The challenge to develop the right mix of precommitment strategies is 
considerable, and the risk of any particular law being perversely hijacked 
can never be eliminated.  But through the kind of asymmetric hurdles 
and shortcuts described above, Congress could at least diminish the risk 
of short-term pressures undermining whatever legislation it passes and 
increase the chance that the concerns of future generations would not be 
forgotten during the decades required for the new law’s ambitious 
objective to be achieved. Perhaps a year from now, Congress will have 
taken some significant strides in that direction. 
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